Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 74

Issue 2

Article 1

2009

Pushing the Envelope: Why Washington, DC Airspace Restrictions
Do Not Enhance Security
John W. Heck

Recommended Citation
John W. Heck, Pushing the Envelope: Why Washington, DC Airspace Restrictions Do Not Enhance
Security, 74 J. AIR L. & COM. 335 (2009)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol74/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more
information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

PUSHING THE ENVELOPE: WHY WASHINGTON, DC
AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS DO NOT
ENHANCE SECURITY
JOHN

W.

HECK, MAJOR,

USAFR*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................
II. CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF:TSA'S LEGISLATIVE
MANDATE AND SCOPE OF AUTHORITY ........

A. A

338

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF FLIGHT AND

REGULATION ....................................

338

THE AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ACT OF 2001 ...................................

340

HOSTILE AIRCRAFT AHEAD: THE FAA AND
TSA CREATE THE FLIGHT RESTRICTED ZONE
AND AIR DEFENSE IDENTIFICATION ZONE ....
A. THE FAA AND TSA TAKE CHARGE ..............

342
342

B.
III.

336

B.

C.

CARELESS AND RECKLESS: THE DC SPECIAL
FLIGHT RULES AREA AND FLIGHT RESTRICTED
ZONE ARE CREATED AND CODIFIED ..............
WHAT SECURITY COSTS: THE ECONOMIC AND
PROFESSIONAL PRICE OF THE SFRA ..............

IV. REGULATORY OVERSIGHT: HOW THE
GOVERNMENT IS HELD ACCOUNTABLE .......

A.

EXECUTIVE ORDER

12,866 ......................

B. THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT .......
C. REGULATORY TAKINGS AND AIR PEGASUS ........
D. CHEVRON DEFERENCE ...........................

344
347
350

350
351

353
357

** J.D., Washington College of Law, American University (2008). Major Heck
is a current and qualified Air Force pilot and is an active general aviation pilot
based in College Park, MD. Major Heck is licensed to practice law in Virginia
and New Jersey. The author wishes to thank the following for their invaluable
assistance with this article: Professor Anthony E. Varona, Washington College of
Law; Lt. J.G. Megan Romigh, U.S. Navy JAG; Erin Slusser, Esq.; and Devan Kirk,
JD. No Department of Defense component officially endorses, sponsors,
approves, or sanctions the views expressed in this article.

335

336

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

E.

THE EXECUTIVE'S DEFERENCE IN MATTERS OF

NATIONAL SECURITY ............................

V. CLEARANCE AVAILABLE: BALANCING
FREEDOM AND SECURITY .......................
A. DEVELOP AN ELECTRONIC PILOT CERTIFICATE ...
B. CREATE A SERIES OF AIRSPACE CORRIDORS OVER
LARGE CITIES ...................................

C.

DEACTIVATE THE

ADIZ

363
364
365

AND REACTIVATE IT

WHEN AN IDENTIFIED THREAT EXISTS ...........

VI. CONCLUSION .....................................
I.

361

367
368

INTRODUCTION

If the federal government should overpass the just bounds of its
authority and make a tyrannical use of its powers, the people,
whose creature it is, must appeal to the standard they have
formed, and take such measures to redress the injury done to the
Constitution as the exigency may suggest and prudence justify.
reject as false the choice be"As for our common defense, we
2
tween our safety and our ideals."

T

WO DAYS AFTER the September 2001 terrorist attacks on
the United States, the cover of the Economist stated simply
"The Day the World Changed."3 Nowhere has this been more
true than in the aviation industry where, driven by a new culture
of fear, Americans now quietly accept restrictions that, less than
a decade ago, were unthinkable. This new regulatory environment goes beyond allocating a few extra minutes to pass
through the security gate at a local airport. Along with excessive
passenger screening and outdated and often incorrect "watch
lists," pilots, mechanics, and air traffic controllers are now subjected to intense scrutiny and constant second-guessing by security personnel with far less experience and training. Pilots face
severe punishment for the slightest deviation into an arbitrary
airspace boundary over the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area
even when no flight safety has been compromised. 4 These illconceived restrictions are estimated to have cost over $300 million in lost revenue from small airports in the region. 5 Addi1 The Federalist No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton).
2 President Barack H. Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009).
3 The Day the World Changed, ECONOMIST, Sep. 13, 2001, at 13.
4 Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 70 Fed. Reg.
45,250 (Aug. 4, 2005) [hereinafter NPRM].
5 Id.
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tionally, understaffed and overworked air traffic controllers are
forced to cope with a system that has punished thousands of
aviators but has not stopped a single terror attack.
Evidence suggests that while these restrictions have made little difference with respect to safety, they have advanced the financial decline of the aviation industry.6 Attempts to reform
aspects of the current system have been stalled due to poor implementation or political maneuvering. Maintaining the status
quo will only strain the aviation system further-500 million additional passengers and hundreds of smaller airplanes, manned
and unmanned, are forecast to take to the airways by 2010.'
While it is impossible to guarantee terror-free skies, strengthened security rules, both published and unpublished, will serve
only to deprive Americans of their right to traverse the airspace
over the United States.
This paper examines the federal government's authority to
impose such restrictions, evaluates the wisdom of current governmental oversight, and concludes that the aviation industry is
poorly secured by the current airspace regulatory system. Part II
provides the historical context underlying the creation of the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and provides the
framework for its regulatory policies. Part III examines several
of these policies and regulations, focusing on the implementation of the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and recentlycodified Special Flight Rules Area (SFRA) over the Washington,
D.C. area and evaluating both the direct and indirect consequences to those affected by the SFRA. Part LV looks at the legality of the TSA's actions through several aspects of agency
regulation, focusing on the authority of an agency to regulate
airspace while balancing national security with individual freedom. Part V concludes by offering several alternatives to the
current system that provide for national security without unduly
depriving American pilots and support staff of their liberty.

6 Comment from Phil Boyer, President, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Ass'n, to
Ellen Crum, U.S. Dep't of Transp. (Nov. 2, 2005), available at http://www.aopa.
org/whatsnew/newsitems/2005/051102aopa-comments.pdf [hereinafter AOPA
Comment]. The AOPA is a not-for-profit organization that has advocated the
interests of general aviation pilots and aircraft owners since 1939.
7 Fear of Flying: A Special Report on Air Travel, ECONOMIST, June 16, 2007, at 4.
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CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF: TSA'S LEGISLATIVE
MANDATE AND SCOPE OF AUTHORITY
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF FLIGHT AND REGULATION

In 1908, Army Signal Corps Lieutenant Thomas Selfridge became the first person to perish in an aircraft accident while evaluating Orville Wright's new flying machine.8 This tragic
incident demonstrated the need to secure the safety of persons
both in the air and on the ground, and the great numbers of
accidents during the barnstorming era of the 1920s led to the
belief that industry regulation was needed. 9 At the urging of
aviation leaders, President Coolidge signed the Air Commerce
Act, which transferred aircraft security from the private sector to
the newly-formed Aeronautics Branch of the Department of
Commerce.1 ° In addition to new security regulations, the Aeronautics Branch directed licensing of aircraft and pilots, the creation of a commercial airway system, construction of navigational
aids, and mandatory accident investigations." When the role of
the Aeronautics Branch expanded, the Commerce Department
renamed it the Bureau of Air Commerce in 1934.12
The new Bureau proved to be short-lived. Four years later,
Congress passed the Civil Aeronautics Act and created a new
agency, the Civil Aeronautics Authority. 13 The agency was subdivided into two separate departments, one of which, the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB), carried out safety programs, rulemaking, and accident investigation. 14 Although formed as part of
the Department of Commerce, the CAB functioned independent of the Secretary, which is similar to modern-day safety
programs.'
The new era of jet travel brought with it a series of mid-air
collisions, prompting legislation to create an independent
8 Airship Falls, Lt. Selifidge Killed, Wright Hurt, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1908.

9 David H. Onkst, Barnstormers, U.S. Centennial of Flight Comm'n, http://
www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Explorers RecordSettersandDaredevils/
barnstormers/EX12.htm (last visited May 24, 2009).
10Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
11 A Brief History of the Federal Aviation Administration, http://www.faa.gov/
about/history/brief history (last visited May 24, 2009) [hereinafter Brief
History].
12 Air Commerce Act.

13 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
14 Brief History, supra note 11.
15 Id.
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agency designed to improve airline safety, among other things. 6
Through the Federal Aviation Act, Congress established the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).17 The Federal Aviation Act
gave the FAA the authority to ensure passenger safety and to
protect property, and the first FAA Administrator launched a
vigorous airline safety campaign.18 While the emphasis on passenger safety was laudable, a surge in aircraft hijackings in the
late 1960s19 required the FAA to go beyond the Aviation Act's
mandate and face the problems of aviation security and aircraft
piracy head on.2 °
Congress later strengthened the FAA's authority to secure air
travel by passing the Anti-Hijacking Act. 2 1 This Act imposed

penalties for skyjackers, gave the President the ability to suspend
air service to the United States from any foreign carrier that fails
to maintain minimum security levels, and provided the FAA the
authority to screen passengers as well as train airport security
personnel. 22 However, to implement these new protocols, the
FAA contracted security screening to private companies, and
generally awarded these contracts to the lowest bidder.2 3 This
system, driven by a governmental mandate requiring airlines to
take charge of security measures, led to screeners that were not
only poorly trained but were, at times, convicted felons.2 4
The government addressed this untenable situation after the
1988 Pan Am flight 103 disaster 5 by passing the Aviation Security Improvement Act. 26 Motivated by a Presidential Commission

on Aviation Security that released a 182-page report calling U.S.
16 Id.
17 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2000)).
18 Brief History, supra note 11.
19Paul Stephen Dempsey, Aviation Security: The Role of Law in the War Against
Terrorism, 41 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 649, 653 (2003). Professor Dempsey notes
that in 1968 there were thirty successful hijackings, seventeen of which had U.S.
registration. Id. In 1969 there were eighty-two, more than in all previous years
combined. Id.
20 Brief History, supra note 11.
21 Antihijacking Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366, 88 Stat. 409 (1974).
22 Dempsey, supra note 19, at 699.
23 Paul R. Verkuil, Symposium: Terrorism, Globalization and the Rule of Law: The
Publicization of Airport Security, 27 CARDozo L. REv. 2243, 2244 (2006).
24 Id.

Dempsey, supra note 19, at 707.
Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-604, 104 Stat.
3066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C.
(2000)).
25
26
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aviation security seriously flawed,27 the Act provided the FAA authority over airport screeners, established leadership positions
within the FAA to oversee security, and mandated research
projects to improve screening technology.28 It also noted the
Commission's concerns about the "lack of coordination and
communication between the State Department, the FAA, and
'' 2 9
the American intelligence gathering community.
Although these changes were welcome, after the 1996 TWA
flight 800 accident, 0 another commission chaired by then Vice
President Al Gore recommended further changes, including the
increased use of passenger profiling, passenger inspections, and
canines and other technology to detect explosives.3 1 These recommendations led to the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act,
which implemented many of the Gore Commission's recommendations and further strengthened the FAA's security role.12
However, in a later report, the FAA admitted that there was no
consensus on who should fund aviation security and left responsibility for security screening to the air carriers themselves.3
This decision made the U.S. one of only three countries (in addition to Canada and Bermuda) that left security to the private
sector-in every other nation in the world airport security was
deemed a state function which was usually left to lawenforcement. 4
B.

THE AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT OF 2001

Despite these regulatory efforts, airport and airway security remained relatively porous, allowing nineteen hijackers to commandeer four commercial airliners in 2001 with disastrous
results. 5 The public demanded the government take a more
active role in aviation security, and in response to this demand,
27 Exec. Order No. 12,686, 54 Fed. Reg. 32,629 (Aug. 9, 1989).
28 49 U.S.C. §§ 44931-44932 (2000).
29 Findingsand Recommendations of the Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, 101st Cong. S6720 (May 15, 1990) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
30 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AVIATION SECURITY: FAA's ACTIONS TO STUDY
RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNDING FOR AIRPORT SECURITY AND TO CERTIFY SCREENING

COMPANIES, RCED-99-53 at 1 (1999).

31 White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, Final Report to
President Clinton (1997).
32 Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 104-264, 110 Stat. 3213
(1996).
33 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 30.
34 Dempsey, supra note 19, at 721.
35 Id. at 721.
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on November 19, 2001, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA).36 The ATSA changed many features of the aviation security landscape-it federalized airport
security functions, mandated background checks on airport employees, and required impenetrable cockpit doors." Noting
that the FAA historically had been slow to implement its wishes,
Congress created perhaps the ATSA's most enduring legacythe Transportation Security Administration (TSA).38 The TSA

assumed the responsibility for aviation security from the FAA
and shifted the focus from an emphasis on aircraft accidents to
identifying infrastructure weaknesses that could be used by terrorists. 9 To accomplish this task, Congress authorized the TSA
to gather intelligence, assess threats, and consult with other governmental agencies as required to accomplish its mission.40 Further, in the event of a national emergency, the TSA is permitted
to take control of all modes of transportation-presumably shutting down the entire transportation network if necessary.41
Since its creation, the TSA has implemented several far-reaching policies seemingly within the scope of its mandate. The TSA
has promulgated regulations requiring an Airport Security Coordinator and the establishment of an Airport Security Program
at each commercial airport,4 2 specific procedural safeguards
throughout the airport,4" and criminal history checks and
mandatory identification systems for employees.44 Additionally,
the TSA exercises considerable control over smaller, non-commercial airports and flight schools, mandating annual employee
security awareness training to recognize suspicious activities of
flight school applicants or participants. 45 TSA's Alien Flight Student Program requires extensive background checks and46 threat
assessments for non-U.S. citizens seeking flight training.
36 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597
(codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C. (2006); 42 U.S.C.,
49 U.S.C. (2000 & Supp. IV 2005)).
37 Dempsey, supra note 19, at 714.
38

Id.

39 Id.

49 U.S.C. § 114(f) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
Dempsey, supra note 19, at 715.
42 Airport Security, 49 C.F.R. § 1542.3, §§ 1542.101-113 (2002).
43 §§ 1542.201-205.
44 §§ 1542.209-211.
45 Flight Schools, 49 C.F.R. § 1552.23 (2004).
46 Transportation Security Administration, Alien Flight Student Program,
http://tsa.gov/what-we-do/layers/afsp/editorial-multi_image-with-table_0215.
40

41
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In 2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act and
transferred the TSA from the Department of Transportation to
the newly-minted Department of Homeland Security (DHS).41
In forming the DHS, Congress created a unified agency designed to prevent future domestic terrorist attacks 48 by absorbing twenty-two existing agencies comprised of 170,000
49
employees and a combined budget of forty billion dollars.
Among those agencies assimilated into the DHS were several
tasked with airport and airline passenger safety and security, including the Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, the Animal and Plant Inspection Service of the Department of Agriculture, and the TSA.5°
III.

HOSTILE AIRCRAFT AHEAD: THE FAA AND TSA
CREATE THE FLIGHT RESTRICTED ZONE AND
AIR DEFENSE IDENTIFICATION ZONE
A.

THE

FAA

AND

TSA TAKE

CHARGE

The FAA has broad power to regulate the airspace over the
United States. 51 Although Congress recognizes the right of each
citizen to transit through navigable airspace,5 2 Congress tempers
this right by a need to protect and identify aircraft, prevent aircraft collisions, and ensure the safety of persons and property on
the ground.5 ' To ensure effective airspace control, the FAA has
the authority "to establish security provisions that will encourage
and allow maximum use of the navigable airspace by civil aircraft consistent with national security .. .

."'

As a result, the

FAA has long-standing authority to create temporary airspace restrictions to respond to rapidly changing air and ground-based
security concerns. These limitations often take the form of
Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFRs) that will temporarily close
the airspace above a place or event that might be vulnerable to
an airborne attack, such as the State of the Union address or the
shtm (last visited May 24, 2009). Non-U.S. citizens must provide the TSA with
biographical information, fingerprints, and training specifics. Id.
47 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
48

6 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).

49 Mimi Hall, Deal Set on Homeland Department, USA TODAY, Nov 13, 2002, at IA.
50 6 U.S.C. § 203 (2006).

See 49 U.S.C. §§ 106(g), 40103(b) (2000).
§ 40103(a).
53 § 40103 (b) (2).
54 § 40103 (b) (3).
51
52
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Super Bowl. 55 These TFRs are ordinarily coordinated with the
Department of Defense and, in the event of an airspace incursion, a military fighter or helicopter may be launched to intercept and divert the offending aircraft.5 6 Pilots receive
notification of a TFR through a Notice to Airman (NOTAM),
which are provided
when the pilot receives their required pre57
flight briefing.
The TSA likewise has significant authority to ensure the safety
of civil aviation. The TSA is charged with developing "policies,
strategies, and plans for dealing with threats to transportation
security," as well as coordinating countermeasures to prevent attacks with the appropriate departments and agencies of the U.S.
government. 5 Although the FAA retains authority over airspace
security, the TSA is permitted to work with the FAA with respect
59
to any actions or activities that might affect aviatioi safety.
While the roles of each agency may overlap, it is generally
viewed as the TSA's responsibility to ensure the ground safety of
passengers and property in and around the airport itself, while
the FAA retains control over security from takeoff to landing.
Within hours after the first attacks on September 11, 2001, the
FAA closed the National Airspace System (NAS), and when the
NAS was re-opened on September 13, a series of temporary but
severe restrictions remained. These restrictions included a complete prohibition on all aircraft operations at civil airports
within a twenty-five nautical mile radius of Washington National
Airport (DCA) 60 and a NOTAM authorizing instrument-only
and limited visual flights outside the twenty-five mile radius.6 1
These restrictions stopped virtually all general aviation flights at
six smaller, regional airports until December 19, when the FAA
issued a second NOTAM decreasing the size of the restricted
airspace. 62 Although reducing the restricted airspace meant
55 14 C.F.R. § 91.145 (2006).
56 Michael W. Brown, TFR-Airspace Obstacles and TFR Trivia: A Pilot's Guide to
UnderstandingRestrictions in Today's National Airspace System, FAA AVIATION NEWS,
November/December 2003, 1, available at http://www.faa.gov/pilots/safety/
notams_tfr/media/tfrwed.pdf.
57 14 C.F.R. § 91.103 (2006).
58 49 U.S.C. § 114(f)(3)-(4) (2000 & Supp. 1 2002).
59 § 114(f)(13).
6 Emergency air traffic rules issued pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 91.139 (2008) and
temporary flight restrictions (TFRs) issued pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 91.137 (2008).
61 Enhanced Security Procedures for Operation at Certain Airports in Washington, DC Metropolitan Area, 68 Fed. Reg. 7684 (Feb. 14, 2003).
62

Id.
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three of these airports could resume limited operations, the
three airports closest to downtown, College Park Airport (CGS),
Potomac Airpark (VKX), and Hyde Field (W32), remained
closed. These airports, known collectively as the "Maryland
Three," were shut down until February 12, 2002, when the FAA
issued Special Federal Aviation Regulation 94 (SFAR 94) governing all operating requirements to take off and land at these
airports. 63 SFAR 94 mandated all pilots and flight crews operating from the Maryland Three undergo a background check, attend an FAA briefing regarding airport security procedures,
maintain no more than one airspace violation on record, and
receive a personal identification number before a flight plan is
filed.64 Because the government formed the TSA in response to
the post-9/11 environment, the FAA retained control over all
security policies and procedures until mid-2002, when the TSA
incorporated the provisions of SFAR 94 into its regulatory
scheme. Although SFAR 94 expired on February 13, 2005, the
TSA incorporated the same security
measures into its regula65
tions, so they remain in effect.
B.

CARELESS AND RECKLESS: THE

DC

SPECIAL FLIGHT RULES

AREA AND FLIGHT RESTRICTED ZONE ARE
CREATED AND CODIFIED

The FAA imposes severe restrictions on all flights above the
DC metropolitan area. On February 10, 2003, the FAA formalized these restrictions with the creation of two new airspace regions. The first, an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ),
surrounded not only metropolitan DC but extended to northern Baltimore and west of Dulles airport. 66 The FAA changed
the ADIZ on August 30, 2007, to a thirty-mile ring centered on
Reagan National Airport.6 7 The FAA also established a smaller,
more strictly controlled portion of airspace with an approximately fifteen nautical mile radius from Reagan National Airport called the Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ).68 The ADIZ
63 14 C.F.R § 91 (2005).
64 Id.

65 NPRM, supra note 4, at 42,252.
66 Helicopter Assoc. Int'l, FAA Issues NOTAM Modifying, Washington, D.C.
ADIZ, http://www.rotor.com/default.aspx?tabid=510&newsid9O5=48897 (last visited May 24, 2009).
67 KZDC NOTAM 7/0206 Flight Restrictions Washington, D.C., (Sept. 10,
2008), available at www.faa.gov.
- KZDC NOTAM 7/0211 Flight Restricts Washington, D.C., (Sept. 10, 2008),
available at www.faa.gov.
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effectively acted as a buffer to alert ground personnel that an
FRZ incursion is possible-essentially, the ADIZ was established
to keep aircraft outside the FRZ and away from the government
buildings it protects. Because the Maryland Three airports lie
within the boundaries of the FRZ, all private air traffic operating
from these airports must enter or exit the FRZ by the shortest
possible route and must maintain a course away from downtown
Washington, D.C.6 9 Both the ADIZ and FRZ extended from the
surface to 18,000 feet above the ground and were operated
continuously.7v
On December 16, 2008, the FAA announced its decision to
codify the FRZ and ADIZ as of February 17, 2009. 7 ' This action,
taken "to enable the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and the Department of Defense (DOD) to effectively execute
their respective constitutional and Congressionally-mandated
duties to secure, protect, and defend the United States," replaced the term ADIZ with "Special Flight Rules Area" (SFRA).72
The new regulatory scheme made no change to previously-established ADIZ airspace boundaries-instead, the SFRA changed
only minor procedural rules to fly in the National Capital Region and clarified existing requirements such as speed restrictions and pilot actions in the event of a transponder failure. v In
codifying the DC SFRA, the FAA created no new airspace categories, but it clarified that the airspace within the SFRA is "national defense airspace" (NDA) and that an SFRA violation will
subject the pilot to criminal prosecution at the discretion of the
Department of Justice. 4
A general aviation pilot desiring to either enter or exit the
FRZ or SFRA is subject to numerous requirements. First, the
pilot must file a DC SFRA flight plan within twenty-four hours of
75
flight stating the departure aerodrome and SFRA exit point. If

69 Id.
70

KZDC NOTAM 7/0206, supra note 67; KZDC NOTAM 7/0211, supra note

68.
71 Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 73 Fed. Reg.
76,195 (Dec. 16, 2008) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 1 and 93) [hereinafter
Final Rule].
72 Id. at 76,195-97.
73 Id. at 76,200.
74 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 46307 (2000)). Interestingly, the FAA does not provide the text of the relevant portion of the U.S.C., which states criminal prosecution is limited to a fine under title 18, imprisonment for not more than one year,
or both-essentially a misdemeanor. 49 U.S.C. § 46307.
75 See id. at 76,214-15.
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he or she requests an FRZ departure or arrival, the pilot must
also provide the personal identification number issued during
the SFAR 94 vetting process.7 6 Second, the pilot must contact
approach control via telephone immediately prior to takeoff
from a DC SFRA or FRZ airport to receive a specific transponder
code used while flying within the SFRA.77 Third, the pilot must
have an operable two-way radio so he or she can maintain continuous radio communication with air traffic control while
within the SFRA.78 Fourth, the pilot must have a working transponder capable of automatically reporting the aircraft's altitude. 9 Finally, the pilot must obtain clearance to fly within the
borders of the airspace of any local airports such as Dulles or
Baltimore-Washington International. °
The SFRA and FRZ are monitored by several governmental
agencies. The air traffic controllers at Potomac Terminal Radar
Approach Control (TRACON) are responsible for 23,000 square
miles of airspace."1 Potomac TRACON's radar data is simultaneously broadcast to a group of federal agencies collectively known
as the National Capital Region Coordination Center
(NCRCC).82 The NCRCC is composed of representatives from
the FAA, the Secret Service, the Capitol Police, the Department
of Defense, the TSA, and the border patrol. In addition, the
NCRCC is responsible for notifying the appropriate agency if an
intercept is required. 8 The SFRA and FRZ are also monitored
by North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), a
United States and Canadian organization charged with the missions of aerospace warning and control for North America."4
Because aircraft are tracked by multiple governmental agencies,
a communication service known as the Domestic Events Network (DEN) allows rapid dissemination of information to the
76

Id.

77 Id.
78

Id.

79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Environmental Impact Statement, Potomac Consolidated TRACON Airspace Redesign, (Dec. 2002), available at www.faa.gov.
82 See General Aviation Security for the Capitol Area: Hearing before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science & Transp., 109th Cong. 2 (2005) (statement of Jonathan Fleming, Chief Operating Officer of the TSA) [hereinafter Senate Hearing].
83 Id.
84 North American Aerospace Defense Command, http://www.norad.mil/
about/index.html (last visited May 24, 2009).
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appropriate authorities.8 5 Either Potomac TRACON, the
NCRCC, or NORAD may use the DEN to notify the other agencies of a possible or ongoing SFRA violation. The decision to
intercept an aircraft is made after a threat assessment is conducted by DHS and TSA officials.8 6 These officials take into account factors including the aircraft's speed, heading, flight path,
8 7
and altitude to determine if an aircraft poses a threat.
C.

WHAT SECURITY COSTS: THE ECONOMIC AND PROFESSIONAL
PRICE OF THE SFRA

SFRA violations near Washington, D.C. occur regularly. From
the NCRCC's creation inJanuary 2003 throughJune 2005, 3,369
airspace incursions were reported resulting in 1,411 pilot violations.88 In 2006, Potomac TRACON reported 338 pilot violations, or an average of one a day.8 9 By way of comparison,
TRACON facilities of similar size throughout the United States
process an average of fifty-four deviations per year. 90 The vast
majority of these violations occurred when a pilot inadvertently
changed his transponder code or did not enter the correct code
prior to entering the ADIZ, although other violations occurred
when pilots traveling cross country did not familiarize themselves with the ADIZ procedures before takeoff.9 1 Violations
also occurred through aircraft equipment failure when, unbeknownst to the aviator, his or her transponder or radio became
intermittent and they were therefore unable to take prompt corrective action. 92 A recorded violation may have serious consequences for the aviator so charged. In addition to a suspension
or revocation of his flight privileges, the pilot may face civil or
criminal charges, may have his clearance to operate into or out
of the Maryland Three removed, and may be subject to fines
and charges for the cost of any military intercept operations. 93
With the establishment of the DC SFRA, the FAA is likely to
continue this pattern of pilot violations. In its Final Rule, the
85 See Senate Hearing, supra note 82.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.

89 Randy Horner, Air Traffic Control Support Specialist, Potomac TRACON,
Presentation during an "Operation Raincheck" ADIZ Seminar (Aug. 18, 2007)
(on file with author).
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.

93 NPRM, supra note 4, at 45,253.
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FAA noted "knowing or willful violations of national defense airspace may subject the pilot to criminal liability" and " [t] he exercise of any prosecutorial decision to file criminal charges ...is a

decision that will be made by the appropriate Federal prosecutors ....

"9

Responding to pilot concerns that an amnesty pro-

gram should be offered as an alternative to the FAA's zero
tolerance policy toward unintentional SFRA incursions, the FAA
stated "[i]ncursions into this airspace, whether intentional or
not, or violations of any other procedures or rules applicable to
in
this airspace, are taken very seriously, and may be 9enforced
5
accordance with the FAA's enforcement authority.

ADIZ restrictions have also imposed a severe financial burden
on the general aviation community, resulting in an estimated
$43 million loss per year to the general aviation community.9 6
Losses to the Maryland Three airports have been substantialfor example, after College Park airport was re-opened in February 2002, it suffered a ninety-two percent decrease in operations. 97 FRZ restrictions proved so deleterious that in 2005,
Congress authorized financial compensation of $17 million to
those airports hit hardest by the rules, including $5 million immediately available on a pro-rata basis.98 These funds were
made available "to reimburse fixed-based general aviation operators and the providers of general aviation ground support services . . . for direct and incremental financial losses incurred

while such airports were closed to general aviation operations
...due

to the actions of the Federal Government following the

terrorist attacks on the United States that occurred on September 11, 2001 ....-"9 Although this action provided some degree

of relief for small airports in the DC area, the remedial effect of
this legislation is limited to past actions only and makes no provision for financial losses incurred by the ongoing burdens imposed by the SFRA.
94

Final Rule, supra note 71, at 76,204.

95 Id.

96 AOPA Comment, supra note 6.
97 AOPA Tells Congress Opening Reagan National Only Part of the Job, AOPA ONLINE, Mar. 16, 2004, available at http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/newsitems/
2004/04-1-137.html.
98 Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary,
the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 109-115, § 185, 119 Stat. 2396, 2431 (2005); Congress Provides $5 Million Compensation for DC-3 Airports AOPA ONLINE, Nov 22, 2005, available at http://www.
aopa.org/whatsnew/newsitems/2005/051122dc3.html.

9 § 185.

PUSHING THE ENVELOPE

2009]

349

Because the ADIZ and FRZ were designed as a temporary
measure, Congress has challenged the FAA's need to impose
these restrictions. In 2003, Congress explicitly required the FAA
to transmit a report justifying the ADIZ every sixty days until
such time as the ADIZ is rescinded. 0 0 Although this report is
classified, it must "include a description of any changes in procedures or requirements that could improve operational efficiency
or minimize operational impacts of the ADIZ on pilots and controllers."' 0 ' The FAA has confirmed that it "did not submit reports to Congress explaining the need for the DC SFRA," noting
instead that the "Secretary of DHS ...

briefed Congress on the

need for the DC SFRA" and that after four years had passed "the
Congressional Research Service performed its own research on
the aviation security needs in the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area.'

10 2

Congress also provided for an appeal process for pilots adversely affected through a finding that they represent a security
risk to airline or passenger safety.10 3 Although provisions exist
for the protection of classified information, any U.S. citizen
whose flight certificate is revoked is entitled to an on the record
hearing that is not based on the findings of the FAA or DHS. 104
Finally, once the appeal has begun, the appellant is entitled to a
written explanation of the administrative judge's determinations
and all relevant documents used in making that determination. 0 5 The FAA and TSA have largely ignored this requirement with respect to ADIZ and FRZ violations, routinely
resorting to disciplinary action without providing evidence to
support its conclusion even when such evidence is requested by
the pilot.106

100 Vision 100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-176,
§602(a), 117 Stat. 2490, 2563 (2003).
101 § 602(c).
102 Final Rule, supra note 71, at 76,206.
103 §601 (d).
104 § 601 (b)-(c).
105 § 601(f). Note that this does not include classified information and is limited to disclosure of only those documents "that the national security interests of
the United States and other applicable laws permit." Id.
106 See Phil Boyer, President, Aircraft Owner's and Pilot's Association, Remarks
at Washington DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area Public Meeting
(Jan. 18, 2006), available at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/Content
Viewer?objectld=09000064802e94ee&dispostion=attachment&contentType=pdf.
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TV. REGULATORY OVERSIGHT: HOW THE
GOVERNMENT IS HELD ACCOUNTABLE
A.

EXECUTVE ORDER

12,866

Since the passage of the Government in the Sunshine Act," °7
Congress has expressed an intent to provide a government that
is, for the most part, "fully accountable to [the people] for the
actions which it supposedly takes on their behalf."1 °8 To further
this objective, in 1993, President Clinton signed Executive Order (E.O.) 12,866 outlining the principles agencies must follow
when promulgating regulations. 0 9 E.O. 12,866 grants the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) the authority
to review new significant regulations under consideration by a
federal agency." 10 An action is "significant" if, among other
things, it is likely to have an annual effect on the economy of at
least $100 million, adversely affects the economy or a sector of
the economy, or "raise [s] novel legal or policy issues arising out
of legal mandates .

If the OIRA determines that E.O.
"11'
"..

12,866 applies, an agency may put forth only "regulations as are
required by law, are necessary to interpret the law, or are made
necessary by compelling public need, such as material failures of
private markets to protect or improve the health and safety of
the public, the environment, or the well-being of the American
people.""' 2
Although E.O. 12,866 was part of President Clinton's
reinventing government initiative, many regulatory agencies
have ignored its requirements." 3 Rather than performing a
thorough economic analysis within the required 120-day timeline, many agencies have opted to perform partial accounting of
expected costs, have published economic analyses that are unclear or incomplete, or have failed to adequately explore alternative solutions.' 1 4 As a result, E.O. 12,866's requirement to

show that the benefits of a regulation justify the associated expense has, in practice, failed to ensure that decisions are made
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006).
H.R. Rep. No. 94-880(I) (1976).
109 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
110 See id. § 2(b).
IIIId. § 3(f).
112 Id. § 1.
13 Robert W. Hahn et al., Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failure of
Agencies to Comply with Executive Order 12,866, 23 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 859,
860-61 (2000).
114 Id. at 861.
107

108
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that maximize the efficiency or effectiveness of a regulatory
action." 5
In its proposal to codify the FRZ and ADIZ, the FAA acknowledged its proposed rule is a "significant regulatory action" as defined in section 3(f) of E.O. 12,866.116 However, the agency
justified the codification by stating that the benefits of such a
rule outweigh the associated costs." 7 In its Final Rule codifying
the DC SFRA, the FAA acknowledged the SFRA "impacts aircraft
operators, airports, and aviation-related businesses in the Washington, DC region," "has reduced revenue at airports and aviation-related businesses," and has "caused some operators.., to
cease operations altogether." ' Although the FAA estimates the
loss to the public and private sector over ten years is at least
$1.04 billion, it asserts some costs may be minimized because,
for example, some pilots "would fly to alternate airports outside
the proposed DC SFRA, resulting in an increase in operations
and revenue for these alternate airports.""' The FAA admits
that it does not have complete data on the economic impact of
its proposal, noting that the ADIZ affects "approximately 150
airports" and "the FAA does not know if these . . . provisions

would have a significant impact on a substantial number of all
those airports." 120 Although it is admittedly difficult to quantify
the price of secure airspace over a densely populated area, the
FAA seems to have vastly underestimated the economic burden
on local airports and associated businesses. One estimate, for
example, places the private sector costs of the ADIZ at a minimum of $43 million annually-far in excess of the $29.6 million
121
annual cost proposed by the FAA.
B.

THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT

Similarly, federal agencies may not create rules that impose a
significant financial burden on state or local governments without providing funding to carry out its rules. Pursuant to the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA), the federal government
must perform a cost-benefit analysis before putting in place regulations that "impos[e] unfunded Federal mandates on States
15

Id. at 877.

116

NPRM, supra note 4, at 45,255.

Id.
11 Final Rule, supra note 71, at 76,209.
119NPRM, supra note 4, at 45,257.
120 Id.
121 AOPA Comment, supra note 6, at 7.
117
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and local governments."' 122 To achieve this goal, the UMRA requires that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) conduct a
thorough cost analysis and compare the cost findings of the
CBO to those of the agency proposing the new rules. 123 If the
CBO finds that the federal government is significantly shifting
or local
the costs associated with the new regulations to state
124
authorities, the agency's actions may be invalidated.
As with the requirements of E.O. 12,866, many federal agencies have either ignored or watered down the requirements of
the UMRA. Although agencies are required to consider the
"least costly, most cost-effective, or least burdensome alternative" before promulgating regulations, many state and local governments still bear the burden of federal regulation. 125 Indeed,
many small businesses are now subject to the costs of federal
policies through unforeseen expenses such as health insurance,
workers' compensation, and other federally mandated employee
compensation associated with carrying out agency
requirements.

126

The FAA claims its proposed regulatory requirement "does
not impose an unfunded mandate on state, local, or tribal governments, or on the private sector. ' 1

27

Because the FAA con-

cludes that no state, local or tribal government, or any member
of the private sector, will be required to face "an expenditure of
$100 million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any
one year," the UMRA is not applicable. 28 Yet the FAA has acknowledged its assessment of the financial costs associated with
the ADIZ and FRZ is not wholly complete and invited comments
to obtain a better understanding of the monetary impact of its
rule.1 29 Although the gap between the FAA's cost estimate and
the $100 million threshold is large, it is not unreasonable to
compel the CBO to conduct a UMRA analysis because the pro122 Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48
(1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. 1501 (2000)).
123 2 U.S.C. § 1511 (2000).
124 2 U.S.C. § 1513 (2000).
125 Angela Antonelli, Promises Unfulfilled: Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995,
CATO INSTITUTE, Spring 1996, at 48, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regvl9n2/vI9n2-5.pdf.
126 See generally Angela Antonelli, The Senate's Opportunity to Shine a Light on Proposed Federal Mandates, HERITAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER, April 2, 1999,
available at http://www.heritage.org/research/regulafion/upload/18429_1.pdf.
127 NPRM, supra note 4, at 45,255.
128 Id. at 45,259.
129 Id. at 45,250.

PUSHING THE ENVELOPE

2009]

353

posed rule imposes very significant yet undetermined costs on
not only the federal government, but also the private sector.
Further, the CBO is likely the best agency to determine whether
the FAA's understanding of the true nature of the costs of its
rulemaking proposal is accurate.
C.

REGULATORY TAKINGS AND AIR PEGASUS

Since its inception, the TSA has come under scrutiny by public and private groups alleging it has overused its power through
broad claims of protection. ° The same may be argued for
those airports affected by the ADIZ and FRZ-although not officially closed by the government, airports and heliports within
the FRZ have seen operations decrease to such an extent that
many have either gone out of business or been forced to reduce
services to a fraction of their pre-9/11 levels. This end-game
may be considered an unlawful regulatory taking, which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Although governments typically have broad police powers,
those powers may not create a circumstance where private property has been divested through either an outright taking of title
or a defacto situation where a party is constructively deprived of
its property.'
The Fifth Amendment prohibits such a taking by
requiring 'just compensation" if private property is taken for

public use.' 3 2 In determining what qualifies as "property," the
Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment applies to
property of state and local governments as well as that of private
citizens. 133 Further, a legally protected property interest is not
limited to tangible goods or services-a financial loss resulting
from an economic interest or advantage in property is sufficient
134
to trigger Fifth Amendment protection.
Additionally, the Court recognizes that over-regulation of private property may, in some instances, "be so onerous that its
effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster-and
that such 'regulatory takings' may be compensable under the
Fifth Amendment." 135 Generally, a regulatory action is deemed to
be a taking if the action is one that is functionally equivalent to a
130 Sara Kehaulani Goo, Air Security Agency FacesReduced Role, WASH. POST, Apr.
8, 2005, at A01.
131Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-15 (1922).
132 U.S. Const. amend. V.
133 United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 31 (1984).
134 United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945).
135 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005).
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direct appropriation of or ouster from private property, and
courts will look to the severity of the burden that government
imposes upon property rights when making such a determination. 11 6 The Supreme Court recently clarified the standing requirements for determining what constitutes a regulatory
taking: an uncompensated taking of private property may proceed by alleging a "physical" taking, "total regulatory taking," a
taking through an evaluation of the economic impact and character of the governmental action, or a land-use exaction
exclud13 7
ing others from entering and using their property.
In Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, the U.S. Court of
Appeals examined the scope of a regulatory takings claim arising from airspace restrictions over Washington, D.C. 13 8 Air Pegasus, owner and operator of a heliport a mile and a half south of
the U.S. Capitol building, ceased operations on September 30,
2002 as a result of the FAA's prohibition on all commercial
flights not originating from Reagan National Airport.'39 The
court stated that, for a regulatory takings claim to succeed, the
claimant "must, at a minimum, assert that its property interest
was actually taken by the government action."' 4 ° The court, noting that "there is a significant difference between an injury to
one's property interest and a taking of one's property interest,"
held that the FAA had not "taken" the real property interest in
question-Air Pegasus' leasehold permitting third parties to operate helicopters from its helipad-but rather had only been economically harmed by the FAA's restrictions.' 4 '
The court also disagreed that Air Pegasus had a "right of access to the navigable airspace from its heliport.'

42

Although the

court hinted that Air Pegasus had the right to use the non-navigable airspace immediately above its leasehold, it reiterated the
well-established principle "that the navigable airspace is public
property not subject to private ownership. 1 1 43 The court like-

wise dismissed the argument that the FAA acted outside its navigational servitude permitting private parties (the "servient
tenement") to operate within its airspace, holding that "because
Id.
Id. at 548.
138 424 F.3d 1206, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
139 Id. at 1208, 1210.
-4i Id. at 1215.
141 Id. at 1216.
142 Id. at 1217.
136
137

143 Id.
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there is no private property interest here to which the government's servitude could attach, we do not see how the principles
underlying the servitude are relevant to this case. '
The Air Pegasus holding is compelling for several reasons.
First, the Circuit Court of Appeals seemingly affirmed the lower
court's holding that "Air Pegasus entered this highly regulated
area, in Washington D.C., with the knowledge that the government reserved the power, and indeed regularly exercised its
power, to restrict air flight patterns and procedures,"' 14 5 further
noting that "the air is a public highway."' 46 In response, the dissent pointed out that although the FAA has the right to control
the nation's navigable airspace, the airspace restrictions in question were "taken abruptly and without notice, transcend[ing]
'
any reasonably foreseeable regulatory action."147
In the dissent's
view, "even 'pervasive' regulation does not preclude application
of Fifth Amendment principles," and that the majority notably
avoided addressing the fundamental question of whether "Air
Pegasus [can] be reasonably charged with accepting the commercial risk of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the immediate government response by closing the airspace. '"148

Second, the majority found that because the events leading to
Air Pegasus' failure resulted from "an extraordinary response to
a catastrophic event," the "unforeseeable governmental action
rendered Air Pegasus' leasehold valueless.

' 149

However, this

holding-that those who own a lease permitting aircraft to take
off and land cannot survive a Fifth Amendment regulatory takings claim-is narrow. Air Pegasus owned neither the aircraft
that flew from its helipad nor the building on which the helipad
was based. The Air Pegasuscourt did not address possible causes
of action from aircraft or airport owners, stating only that the
Fifth Amendment provides no remedy for derivative claims
"based on a perceived taking of property owned by other
'
parties."150
When the FAA codified the DC SFRA, it stated that because
"airspace is not private property," its restrictions "do not constitute a taking of private property without due process or just
Id. at 1219.
Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 60 Fed. C1. 448, 457 (2004).
146 Air Pegasus, 424 F.3d at 1217.
147 Id. at 1220 (NewnanJ., dissenting).
148 Id. at 1221-22.
149 Id. at 1220.
150 Id. at 1219.
144
145
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compensation.' 15 ' The FAA argued that the "indirect economic
cost and personal inconvenience is not an impact unique to the
general aviation community or the Washington, DC area," but is
an "impact experienced by many individuals and businesses in
all areas of commerce as a result of the variety and scope of new
security measures imposed.., after the September 11, 2001 attacks.' 1 52 Although the economic effect the FAA mentions is undeniable, it is noteworthy that no aircraft owners and operators,
nor any airports, have filed suit, nor has the FAA offered a legal
interpretation of its actions.
Additionally, although the TSA and FAA have not exercised
full physical control over airports within the DC SFRA, its NPRM
asserting its jurisdiction over the Maryland Three airports within
the FRZ is, according to the TSA, required it to prevent these
15
airports from being "closed due to the FAA requirements.""
The TSA argues that because its rules "enhance[ ] protection
for a significant number of vital government assets in the National Capital Region," a failure to implement these rules would
54
justify permanent closure of economically viable airports.
The TSA fails to point out that Reagan National Airport, with
much larger aircraft capable of far greater damage, remains
open largely because there was no political support for its permanent closure. Additionally, the TSA acknowledges that a
small aircraft's impact "may not cause substantial damage to
property or a large structure," but steadfastly reiterates that without these rules, a complete taking through a physical closure of,
as a minimum, the Maryland Three airports would be
necessary.' 5 5
Should the TSA permanently close all of the private airports
near downtown Washington, D.C., it would almost certainly be
liable for a regulatory taking. " [W] hen the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial
uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking."' 5 6 The TSA's
151

Final Rule, supra note 71, at 76,207.

152

Id.

Maryland Three Airports: Enhanced Security Procedures for Operations at
Certain Airports in the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted
Zone, 70 Fed. Reg. 7150, 7160 (Feb. 10, 2005) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R pt.
1562).
153

154

Id.

155

Id.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).

156
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mission, to "protect[ ] the Nation's transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce," 157 is one
that is done no doubt for the common good. As such, any TSA
action that permanently shuts down an airport is presumably
done to protect a larger group of individuals and should thus be
construed as a taking.
This interpretation seemingly coincides with Congress's decision to appropriate $17 million to airports affected by the ADIZ
and FRZ, an action which could reasonably be interpreted as a
pre-emptive measure against possible Fifth Amendment takings
claims.1 58 However, because this measure was designed to compensate for losses incurred as a result of post-9/11 security measures and did not address the ongoing financial losses suffered
since the passage of the Appropriations Act in 2006, a takings
claim may still be warranted should the TSA take additional
measures.
D.

CHEVRON DEFERENCE

To ensure the courts do not become overly political, executive agencies are normally entitled to a good deal of deference
when interpreting an otherwise ambiguous statute. 159 Under

the Chevron deference, courts apply a two-part test when evaluating the legality of an executive agency's statutory interpretation.160 First, courts look to whether Congress has clearly and
unambiguously spoken to the question at issue. 6 ' Second, if
Congress has not spoken, courts look to whether the agency's
interpretation is "based on a permissible construction of the
statute."1 6' 2 The Chevron doctrine not only acknowledges that
more than one reasonable statutory interpretation may exist, it
also legitimizes policy choices that have been left open by
Congress. 6 '
This seemingly sweeping doctrine is not without limitations.
Ten years after Chevron, the Supreme Court clarified that "an
157 Transportation Security Adminsitration Mission, Vision, and Core Values,
http://www.tsa.gov/who-we are/mission.shtm (last visited May 24, 2009).
158 Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary,
the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 109-115, § 185, 119 Stat. 2396, 2431 (2005).
159 Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 838 (1984).
160 Id. at 842.
161

Id.

162

Id. at 843.
Id. at 843-44.

163
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agency's interpretation of a statute is not entitled
when it goes beyond the meaning that the statute
Indeed, agencies may not lawfully implement "a
revision of the statute" that departs from the "idea
acted into law .

to deference
can bear." 164
fundamental
Congress en-

The Court later clarified the extent of

"...165

the Chevron doctrine when it held that an agency's statutory construction "is premised on the theory that a statute's ambiguity
constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency
to fill in the statutory gaps."' 66 There may, the Court acknowledged, "be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress
1 67
has intended such an implicit delegation."

The SFRA and FRZ exist not because of statutory interpretation, but because of an executive agency's assertion that these
restrictions are necessary to protect the security of our nation's
capital. The more fundamental question is therefore not the
extent to which the Chevron deference applies, but whether
Chevron applies at all. Responding to numerous legal concerns
about the reach of Chevron, the Supreme Court has created a
"Step Zero" analysis to determine if Chevron is triggered as a
question of law. 168 In a trilogy of cases, the Court held that Chevron applies when agency decisions arise from congressionallydelegated authority to act with the force of law. 1 69 Although
presumably designed to delineate the point at which Chevron attaches, the "Step Zero" analysis has in fact resulted in more confusion and complexity among lower courts. 17°

Rather than

looking to statutory language to determine the extent of an
agency's authority, courts must first determine if Congress "delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying
the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.'

171

If Congress "would expect the agency to be able to speak with

164 MCI

Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 229 (1994).
See id. at 231-32.
166 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).
167 Id.
168 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187, 191 (2006).
169 Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217-22 (2002); United States v. Meade
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001); see Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576,
165

587 (2000).
170 See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power to Say What the Law
Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2602 (2006).
171 Meade, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
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the force of2 law," it is likely the agency is entitled to Chevron
7
deference.
The "force of law" test is ambiguous because it places the burden on litigants and the courts to determine congressional intent. The leading "Step Zero" case, United States v. Meade Corp.,
offers limited guidance, stating only that delegation of the force
of law "may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency's
power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment
rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable congressional intent."' 3 It is therefore instructive to review the
FAA's enabling statute to determine both if Congress intended
for the FAA to act with the force of law and, if so, to what extent.
49 U.S.C. § 40101 provides, in part:
(c) General safety considerations.-. .. the Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration shall consider the following
matters:
(1) the requirements of national defense and commercial
and general aviation.
right of freedom of transit through the navi(2) the public 174
airspace.
gable
In balancing the requirements of national defense against the
public interest, Congress directs:
(d) Safety considerations in public interest.- . the Administrator shall consider the following matters, among others, as being in the public interest:
(1) assigning, maintaining, and enhancing safety and security as the highest priorities in air commerce.
(2) regulating air commerce in a way that best promotes
safety and fulfills national defense requirements ....
(4) controlling the use of the navigable airspace and regulating civil and military operations in that airspace in the interest of the safety and efficiency of both of those operations
175

It is clear that Congress intended that the FAA manage aviation matters concerning national security and balance that requirement against both the safety of those involved and the
general right of access to navigable airspace. When attempting
to codify the ADIZ and FRZ, both the TSA and FAA held open
172
173
174
175

Id. at 229.
Id. at 226-27.
49 U.S.C. § 40101(c) (2000).
Id. at § 40101(d).
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discussions and invited public scrutiny through a lengthy notice
of proposed rulemaking procedure. 176 Consequently, under a
"Step Zero" analysis it seems Chevron applies. Although several
judicial "Step Zero" questions remain unanswered-for example, whether an agency receives deference when deciding on its
own jurisdiction or when stating that its own decisions are not
subject to judicial review-the language of the FAA's enabling
statute is sufficiently clear to argue that the codification of the
FRZ and ADIZ falls within its authority.
The legality of the SFRA becomes less certain under Chevron
itself. It is evident that although Congress authorized the FAA
to coordinate airspace to serve the public interest, it did not
speak directly to the overly burdensome "solution" presented by
the SFRA. To survive judicial scrutiny in a Chevron analysis, the
FAA's interpretation of its statutory authority must be reasonable and permissible.' 77 This interpretation does not necessarily
have to be the correct one, nor is the court required to conclude "that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the
reading the court would have reached if the question initially
1 78
had arisen in a judicial proceeding."

However, the FAA's interpretation must not be contrary to
congressional intent. Although the FAA asserts it has acted well
within its authority, it has arguably created a system that has undermined its mission of promoting air commerce. While the
FAA may certainly create airspace to protect the nation's populace, it must have a compelling reason to do so, and the threat
of minimal damage by a small aircraft with virtually no chance of
causing mass casualties does not meet this standard. Further,
when considered against the backdrop that neither the TSA nor
the FAA has any viable intelligence suggesting the use of a general aviation aircraft as a weapon of mass destruction is even remotely plausible,

179

its

rationale for implementing a system that

deprives pilots of their lawful use of the airspace above them is
even more absurd.
176 See Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 70 Fed.
Reg. 45,250 (Aug. 4, 2005).
177 Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
178 Id. at 843 n.ll.
179 In its Final Rule, the FAA states that intelligence reports have not specified
an imminent threat of attack in the NCR, noting only that "some extremists have
considered using small aircraft for terrorist activities." See Final Rule, supra note
71, at 76,201.
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E.

THE EXECUTIVE'S DEFERENCE IN MATTERS
OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Beneath the claims that the TSA and the FAA have defied
congressional intent by promulgating rules that are neither procedurally correct nor entitled to deference lies the larger argument that such measures are absolutely essential given that
protection of the National Capital Region is a matter of national
security. Indeed, courts have historically given substantial deference to the President concerning his power to protect the nation both at home and abroad. 8 The deference accorded this
power is greater than that provided in Chevron because it arises
under the President's Article II powers instead of Congress's Article I authority. Specifically, Article II of the Constitution states
"It] he President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States
"181

Deference may also be given to the executive when the President invokes his Article II powers as Commander in Chief and
in international matters. The Supreme Court has declared that
Congress "must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction" in foreign affairs
matters." 2 This deference extends to matters of national security. For example, in the landmark case Department of the Navy v.
Egan, the Court ruled that the substance of a hearing before the
Board reviewing security clearance matters was at the discretion
of the agency charged by the Executive Branch with making this
"sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment call."18 3 Yet the
Court did not limit its analysis to matters involving only the protection of sensitive information from unauthorized personnel.
In an unusually broad reading of the Executive's Article II powers, the Court held the government's authority to withhold "national security information from unauthorized persons in the
course of executive business ... falls on the President as head of

the Executive Branch and as Commander in Chief," and that
"courts traditionally [should be] reluctant to intrude upon the
180 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1953) (holding executive
privilege appropriate where evidence exposure of military documents may compromise national security); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106-07 (1875)
(dismissing contract claim to protect civil war era espionage relationship).
18, U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
182 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
183 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988).
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authority of the Executive in military and national security
affairs" 84
However, courts have not allowed the President unfettered
authority even in matters of national security-as is the case with
Chevron deference, this Article II deference to the President is
not absolute. For example, as the Supreme Court articulated in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the executive is not allowed to hold suspected terrorists in violation of their due process rights.'8 5 In
Hamdan, the Secretary of Defense argued that critical national
security concerns constituted a legitimate suspension of habeas
corpus, but the Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the President may only deprive an individual of the protections of the
'
judiciary in "cases of a controlling necessity."186
Further, the
Court held that the Executive cannot take any action "incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress" regardless of
the reason.1 8 7 Although the decision in Hamdan was watered
down by the subsequent passage of the Military Commissions
Act of 2006,18 the lesson was clear-absent express congressional authority, the power of the Executive has limits. As Justice Breyer stated in his concurring opinion:
Where, as here, no emergency prevents consultation with Congress, judicial insistence upon that consultation does not weaken
our Nation's ability to deal with danger. To the contrary, that
insistence strengthens the Nation's ability to determinethrough democratic means-how best to do so. The Constitution places its faith in those democratic means.'
In requiring the FAA to justify its creation of the ADIZ, Congress apparently balked at the restrictions placed on the general
aviation community. In refusing to comply with that requirement, the FAA circumvented the democratic process through
sweeping claims of national security. However, these claims are
at best tenuous and at worst a deprivation of the freedoms
granted by the Constitution. Providing even a simple justification that would satisfy Congress would allow public scrutiny of
the arbitrary airspace rule that currently penalizes a smaller class
184

Id. at 527, 530.

185

548 U.S. 557, 589-90 (2006).
Id. at 592.
Id. at 638-39 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

186
187

188 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600

(2006).
189 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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of persons in favor of a claimed, but nonexistent, protection of a
larger class of persons.
Such ajustification may be hard to come by. In its NPRM, the
FAA neglects to mention that the aircraft that attacked the Pentagon came not from an airport within the FRZ, but from Dulles. The FAA also fails to address the fact that the amount of
damage a small aircraft could cause is minimal. Because the vast
majority of general aviation airplanes are lightweight single-engine aircraft with six or fewer seats, they can carry a very limited
payload and travel only at relatively slow speeds. 190 One recent
report estimated that it would take more than one thousand
small planes acting as one to equal the destructive potential of a
single airliner. 9 ' Although it is true that even a payload of several hundred pounds of chemical, biological, or nuclear material could, theoretically, cause substantial damage, it is highly
unlikely that such an attack could be successfully carried out.
The logistics in obtaining such material, weaponizing it, creating
a viable delivery system, placing it into a small aircraft unnoticed, and then getting close enough to cause substantial damage make such an attack virtually impossible. 192 Indeed, in its
Final Rule, the FAA stated that "an aircraft, regardless of size,
could be used to transport individuals with criminal intentions
or dangerous materials that could do significant harm to the
NCR," but offered only a vague "concern that terrorists may turn
to general aviation as an alternative method for conducting op193
erations" as evidence supporting its claim.
V.

CLEARANCE AVAILABLE: BALANCING
FREEDOM AND SECURITY

Because the FAA and TSA have provided solutions that are
both impractical and overreaching, alternative remedies must
be pursued to best provide for security over both the nation's
capital and other cities with large populations and key assets to
protect. Several solutions exist, many of which do not have the
economic shortcomings or the heavy-handedness of the current
approach.
190General Aviation Serves America, GA Aircraft are Not a Threat-Small and
Slow, http://www.gaservesamerica.com/gasecurity/gaaircraft.html (last visited
May 24, 2009).
191 Id.
192 See

The TerrorNext Time? Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Threats, ECONOMIST,
Oct. 6, 2001, at 73.
193 Final Rule, supra note 71, at 76,201-02.
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A.

DEVELOP AN ELECTRONIC PILOT CERTIFICATE

In October 2005, the State Department mandated that all
U.S. passports be issued with a small electronic chip containing
information about the passport's bearer, including basic personal information and a digital photograph. 9 4 These "electronic passports" are globally interoperable, contain "digital
signatures" designed to prevent tampering, and only broadcast
personal information when placed within ten centimeters of an
authorized chip reader. 9 5 The International Civil Aviation Organization developed the specifications for this technology,
which is intended to provide further assurance at all points of
entry that the bearer of a passport is the same person listed
96
therein.1
Electronic identification is also being used to pre-screen airline passengers, allowing them to travel through an "express
lane" and bypass many security checkpoints. Through a system
known as "fly clear," the TSA pre-screens passengers who, after
application approval, are provided with a card that allows them
to pass through special security lanes at certain airports. 197 The
card contains more information than that found on an electronic passport, including either a fingerprint or retinal image
provided by members during enrollment. 9
Unfortunately, the FAA has not made similar advances in
technology regarding pilot certification. Currently, pilots receive plastic "credit card" style certificates that contain neither a
photograph nor an electronic chip. 9 9 After many years of debate on how to implement a system to replace paper certificates,
in February 2008 the FAA released its Final Rule mandating all
pilots receive a new plastic certificate by 2010.200 In the Final
Rule, the FAA concedes that although the Intelligence Reform
14 Electronic Passport Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 61,553, 61,555 (Oct. 25, 2005) (to be
codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 51).
195 Id. at 61,553.
196

Id.

197 Flyclear.com, Membership Agreement, http://www.flyclear.com/apply/ap-

ply-membershipagreement.html (last visited May 24, 2009); Flyclear.com, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.flyclear.com/faq (last visited May 24,
2009).
198 Id.
99 AOPA

Online, Regulatory Brief: FAA Security-Enhanced Pilot Certificates,
http://aopa.org/whatsnew/regulatory/certificates.html
(last visited May 24,
2009).
200 Drug Enforcement Assistance, 73 Fed. Reg. 10,662 (Feb. 28, 2008) (to be
codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 47, 61, 63, 65).
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and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requires the inclusion of
digital photographs on pilot certificates, it is "currently evaluating its options with regard to the best method to meet this requirement .... .201 Because the FAA is willing, for the time
being, to require only that pilots carry another form of photo
identification with them to validate the authenticity of their certificates, it is likely that an electronic certificate is at least a decade away.
This policy is misguided for several reasons. First, an electronic certificate would allow all pilots, not merely those in the
Washington, D.C. area, to be vetted at the time the certificate is
issued. Such a procedure would largely eliminate concerns
about the wayward pilot who wishes to land at a Maryland Three
airport but must wait up to two months for approval. Second, ecertification would simplify flight operation by allowing pilots to
check in by touching their card to a reader prior to flight. If
properly networked, a pilot's card swipe could also pre-file his
departure flight plan with air traffic control and would provide a
record of that pilot's activity should any security concerns arise.
Finally, an e-certificate would make great strides in reducing the
number of pilots who fly with an expired checkride or invalid
medical certificate by alerting the FAA should such a pilot wish
to take off.
B.

CREATE A SERIES OF AIRSPACE CORRIDORS
OVER LARGE CITIES

Another proposal, first advanced by the Aircraft Owners and
Pilots Association (AOPA) in 2003, is establishing corridors designed to go to specific destinations.2 °2 Pilots flying along these
corridors would be required to use a specific transponder code
matched to a specific airport and would therefore be "known" to
the air traffic controller and security personnel. 2 3 Additionally,
specific radio frequencies and altitudes could be established for
entry and exit into airports surrounding major metropolitan areas, and these items could be published in the navigational
charts pilots are required to carry.
Because of current equipment limitations, many transponder
codes are "recycled" and used by other aircraft, so a permanent
Id. at 10,664.
Key Senators BringADIZ Players Together, AOPA ONLINE, Sept. 14, 2006, available at http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/newsitems/20O6/O60914adiz.html.
201
202

203

Id.
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code could not be issued to each airplane. This problem has
two solutions: either assign codes to the corridors themselves
and allow all aircraft ingressing or egressing the airport in question to use those codes, or upgrade the current avionics system
to allow more codes than the current 4,096 available from existing World War II era technology.2 0 4 The first solution is more
easily put into place, as it has virtually no cost and requires only
minimal training for the pilot, but might raise security concerns
because a pilot who simply enters in a code published on a chart
has not been properly assessed as a threat. However, such a system would be virtually identical to that implemented in the
ADIZ, with the only difference being that the pilot under the
current system makes a phone call to get his code instead of
reading it from a chart. While it is true that the phone call also
gives air traffic control more information about the airplane itself, such information is of no value in stopping a determined
attacker with no regard for the safety of his aircraft.
The second solution has already been implemented throughout much of the commercial aviation industry. Rather than replace the conventional transponders, the ICAO has
implemented a system dubbed "Mode-S" that provides a unique
identification number to all aircraft.2 °5 Mode S, based on a 24bit algorithm, allows for over sixteen million unique codes and
is therefore in no danger of becoming obsolete. 20 6 The phased

installation of Mode S transponders is already a fundamental
part of the next generation of airplane avionics which will allow
for much easier transmission of aircraft data to not only monitoring stations on the ground but also other airborne aircraft.20 7
Unfortunately, the new systems can be costly-upwards of sevmay
eral thousand dollars each-so mandating such a change
20 8
budget.
tight
a
on
owners
aircraft
for
prove prohibitive
204 George M. Moore and James D. Caven, Free Fight Technology Requirements
and Liability Issues That May Arise ForEquipment Manufacturers, 62J. AIR L. & CoM.
687, 691 (1987).
205 See Eurocontrol, Mode S Technical Overview, http://www.eurocontrol.int/
(last visited May 24,
msa/public/standard-page/modes-techoverview.html
2009).
206 David Jensen, Europe's Energized Mode S Program, AVIONICS MAG., Apr. 1,
2003, available at http://www.aviationtoday.com/av/issue/feature/808.html.
207 See id.
208 See, e.g., Press Release, Garmin Announces GTX(TM) 328 Mode S Transponder (Jan. 31, 2007), available at http://news.thomasnet.com/fullstory/802
228.
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Regardless, the use of corridors and matching transponder
codes would potentially identify the plane, the pilot, and the
destination. Keeping these components in place, currently the
cornerstone of the existing DC SFRA and FRZ, would allow the
alteration or elimination of the SFRA without compromising security in any way.
C.

DEACTIVATE THE

ADIZ

AND REACTIVATE IT WHEN AN

IDENTIFIED THREAT EXISTS

Airspace restrictions over sensitive areas are not new. In 1938,
"the President reserved and set apart airspace for national defense, the public safety and other governmental purposes. 209
These airspace reservations later became known as "prohibited
areas" and are widely used today to prevent overflight of regions
that are restricted in the name of national security. 210 The size
and shape of these areas can change-for example, Prohibited
Area 56 (P-56), the airspace over and near the White House,
has been altered in response to world events. 21' Additionally,
the area near the Presidential retreat at Camp David (P-40), increases in size from three to ten nautical miles and increases in
size up to 18,000 feet when in use.212 Rules governing prohibited areas are strictly enforced-no person may operate an aircraft within a prohibited area unless authorization has been
granted by the agency responsible for the airspace, and violations are routinely enforced.213
It would therefore be relatively simple to create a new prohibited area encompassing much of downtown Washington, D.C.
Like P-40, this area could be expanded based on the threat level
established by the DHS. Waivers could be obtained much as
they are under the existing SFRA for law enforcement personnel
or military aircraft, and when the threat level is sufficiently low,
no such waiver would be required. Implementing a flexible airspace regime would decrease the workload on not only the air
traffic controllers, but also those at the NCRCC and NORAD
who monitor the airspace for errant aircraft. Such a system requires the DHS to provide accurate intelligence regarding potential airborne terrorist attacks, but obtaining that information
209 NPRM, supra note 4,at 45,252.
210 Id.
211 Id.

212 Brown, supra note 56, at 3.
213 NPRM, supra note 4, at 45,252.
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is precisely why the agency was created. The current system, created around the broad premise that every pilot may be a terrorist, is not only unwieldy but may also create a false sense of
security by incorrectly assuming that attacks are stopped simply
by requiring a would-be terrorist to make a phone call prior to
takeoff.
VI.

CONCLUSION

When justifying the rule requiring its control over the Maryland Three airports, the TSA stated that although the damage
from a small aircraft would likely be negligible, a small aircraft
attack could result in "an undetermined number of fatalities
and injuries and reduced tourism" that "would adversely impact
the regional economies. "214 The TSA therefore concluded that
the benefits associated with its final rule "vastly exceed the
costs. '' 2 15 This would be equally true over any large city, yet no

similar procedure has been implemented anywhere else in the
United States.
Additionally, previous experience shows that the threat associated with small aircraft is virtually nonexistent. A single-engine
airplane that crashed into a downtown building in Tampa, Florida in 2001 did little damage, 2 16 and the majority of repairs from

another single-engine crash into a New York City apartment
building in 2006 were needed because of water damage from
the fire suppression system, or walls that were destroyed by fire
fighters in search of people and pets. 2 17 Indeed, in 1994 a small

aircraft crashed on the south lawn of the White House, killing
the pilot but causing no damage to anything but the aircraft.2 18
Given the profound lapses in security that led to our current
threat environment, it is both unsurprising and necessary that
aviation security be taken very seriously. However, the heavyhanded implementation of our current policies only marginally
Maryland Three Airports: Enhanced Security Procedures for Operations at
Certain Airports in the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted
Zone, 70 Fed. Reg. 7150, 7160 (Feb. 10, 2005) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt
1562).
215 Id.
216 John Woolfolk & Aaron Davis, How Safe are Smaller Airports? Florida Crash
Raises Concerns About General Aviation Access, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 8, 2002,
at IA.
217 James Barron, A Year Later, Building Hit by Cory Lidle's Plane is Almost Whole,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2007, at B3.
218 See Maureen Dowd, Crash at the White House: The Overview; Unimpeded, Intruder Crashes Plane into White House, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 13, 1994, at Al.
214
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enhances security while imposing great costs on our taxpayers
both in terms of dollars spent and freedom sacrificed. There
are simply more elegant and cost-effective solutions than the
"do something" approach to security that currently pervades the
general aviation community. Many solutions were offered
among the 21,380 comments the FAA received during its noticeand-comment period when it closed on February 6, 2006.219

The large number of comments was largely the result of an
enormous lobbying campaign by concerned aviation organizations, and speaks to the enormously unpopular nature of this
arbitrary airspace rule among aviators and businesses alike.
General aviation accounts for seventy-five percent of all air
traffic, provides more than one percent of the United States'
Gross Domestic Product, and supports 1.3 millionjobs in professional services and manufacturing. 22' Although both the TSA
and the FAA assert that severe restrictions over D.C. offer a great
deal of protection, they have crippled the aviation community,
forcing many businesses to close and preventing new pilots from
entering flight school. Because similar restrictions do not exist
for any other city in the U.S., the public outcry has been somewhat muted. Now that the airspace has been made permanent,
the DC SFRA and FRZ may be used as a template for other large
cities. At that point, it may be difficult to reclaim the freedom
of the skies that has so long been an essential part of aviation.
Both the TSA and the FAA gloss over the fact that the general
aviation community itself is profoundly concerned about security issues and has taken great measures to ensure no unauthorized personnel are granted access to general aviation aircraft.
In December 2002, the AOPA and the TSAjointly launched the
Airport Watch Program, establishing a toll-free hotline to express any concerns about suspicious activities. 22 ' In addition to
the hotline, the program provides warning signs, informational
literature, and training videos to local airports, and in 2006, the
DHS authorized an additional $275,000 to ensure the program's
continuance. 22
219 See ADIZ Comment Period Closes on Record-AOPA Continues Advocacy
With Congress, AOPA ONLINE, Feb. 8, 2006, available at http://www.aopa.org/
whatsnew/newsitems/2006/060208adiz.html.
220 Our Economy, http://ivw.gaservesamerica.com/economy/index.html
(last visited May 24, 2009).
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State and local governments, as well as small airports themselves, have likewise contributed to security improvements. Several states now require additional locks on small aircraft, and
one state distributed $1 million in funding to improve lighting,
fencing, and gates at small airports. 23 Other state measures include matching funds to airports that receive Aviation Improvement Program grants for security projects and the distribution
of security checklists to help assess vulnerabilities and adopt security measures that improve their facilities.2 2 4
None of these measures will, by themselves, guarantee that a
determined rogue pilot will not be able to steal an aircraft.
However, given the profound importance of general aviation to
our economy, the best solutions lie not in forcing greater restrictions on small aircraft owners and pilots, but in a series of efforts
designed to ensure the prosperity of the community rather than
to continually tighten an ever-firm strangle hold that has proven
so destructive to pilots and businesses alike.
223
224
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